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I. INTRODUCTION
As has been stated in the earlier briefing on appeal, this case arises from the conveyance
of 21.54 acres of real property ("the Property") from Respondent Brighton Investments, LLC
("Brighton") to Boise State University ("BSU") for the known purpose of ultimately trading the
same property to the Independent School District of Boise ("the School District") so that the
School District could construct a new junior high school facility on the Property. The Property
was originally owned by Appellant Harris Family Limited Partnership ("Hanis"), which also
owns and/or has an interest in other properties and developments near the Property. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 42-43, f[ 3; Harris's Counterclaim to the School District's Complaint for Condemnation.)
Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Harris and Brighton, the Property was to
he encumbered by certain Post-Closing Agreements (collectively, "Restrictive Covcnants") that
were to limit future development of the property to a "manner consistent with . . . the Spring
Creelc and/or Mill District developments" (R. ~xhibit'1, pp. 2-3,v 9, Ex. 8; Affidavit of Counsel
in Opposition to Boise School District's Motion for Order Granting Immediate Condemnation of
Restrictive Covenants and Defendant's Right to Enforce Same ("Simmons Aff.")), which was
!mown to all parties involved to restrict the Property to solely "residential development"
(R. Exhibit 1, p. 3 , l 11, Ex. lo; Simmons Aff.). Brighton's sale of the Property to BSU for the
known purpose of constructing the new junior high school, whether that construction was to be

refer to the numbered exhibits to the Record on Appeal, as
Citations herein to "R. Exhibit "
listed on the District Court Clerk's "Certificate of Exhibits," R. Vol. 11, pp. 421-422A.
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accomplished by way of contract or condemnation, had the effect of nullifying tlie Restrictive
Covenants in their entirety.
The key issues in this appeal center around: (1) The nature and content of the Restrictive
Covenants contained within the parties' Purchase and Sale Agreement and subsequently
recorded Memorandum of Agreement (R. Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3,

ll 8-9, Exs. 7 and 8; Simmons

Aff.); (2) The constitutional right to enter into a contractual relationship, including one giving
rise to restrictive covenants, without having that relationship disturbed or destroyed by the
eminent domain power of the government (R. Exhibit 6, pp. 6-7); (3) The validity of an
independent cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is not
grounded on a breach of an express term of a contract (R. Vol. 11, pp. 267-268, W 35-38); and (4)
The legal and factual distinctions between Harris's claim for severance damages from the School
District and its additional claim for damages from Brighton based on unjust enrichment
(Compare R. Vol. I, p. 4 3 , l 5 (Harris's counterclaim against the School District for "severance

damage to the remaining real property owned by" Harris) with R. Vol. 11, pp. 274-275,ll 62-67
(Harris's third party claim against Brighton for unjust enrichment for the "substantial difference
between the . . . purchase and sale price of the subject real property . . . [which] resulted in a
substantial windfall to" Brighton)).

A review of Respondent's Brief evidences several,

fundamental misunderstandings regarding the aforementioned issues, both in the proceedings
below and on appeal.
Ill
I//
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11. ARGUMENT

A.

Harris Has A Valid Cause Of Action For Breach Of Contract Against Brighton.
Lost in Brighton's arguments on appeal is the traditional legal standard for contract

interpretation. Throughout its brief, Brighton repeatedly emphasizes the need for restrictive
covenants to be expressly stated in order to be valid and binding in the state of Idaho. (See, e.g.,
Respondent's Brief, p. 19.) Important to note, however, is the fact that Brighton did not, at any
point in the proceedings below, previously argue that the express terms of the Restrictive
Covenants do not contain a restriction to solely residential development, as is now contended.
(Id.) While the record is replete with Brighton's arguments that the terms of the Restrictive
Covenants did not place an express restraint on alienatzon (see, e.g., R. Exhibit 3, p. 6 ;
Memorandum in Support of Brighton Investments LLC's Motion to Dismiss ("Brighton's
Dismissal Memo.")), the primary argument now raised by Brighton is nowhere to be found
below.
Even at oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, Brighton focused entirely on whether
the terms of the Restrictive Covenants restrained alienation, and not whether the terms limited
the property to residential use. ( T , p. 912-11. Brighton failed to argue against the limitation
for residential purposes, even though Harris's Third Party Complaint made specific reference to
that limitation in the counts relating to Brighton's alleged breach of contract. (R. Vol. I, pp. 83-

85.) "It is by now a well established rule in Idaho that review on appeal is limited to those issues
raised before the lower tribunal and that an appellate court will not decide issues presented for
the first time on appeal." Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6
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(1986).

Because Brighton failed to argue against the Restrictive Covenants' limitation to

residential use, these arguments (and all implications used throughout Brighton's other
arguments) ought to be disregarded on appeal.
Notwithstanding Brighton's failure to argue below whether the Restrictive Covenants
limited the development of the Property to residences, the circumstances surrounding the
Purchase and Sale Agreement evidence that both Harris and Brighton intended for future
development of the Property to be restricted to residential use. Contrary to Brighton's assertion,
"[Ilt is an established rule that mere ambiguity of a restrictive covenant does not render it void or
unenforceable." Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984) (citing

Alloway v. Moyer, 275 Or. 397, 550 P.2d 1379 (Or. 1976)). "When a court interprets a
restrictive covenant, it is to apply generally the same rules of construction as are applied to any
contract or covenant." Brown v. Perlnns, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434,437 (1996) (citing

Sun Valley Ctr. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 41 1,413,690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984)). "[Wlhere the
terms of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract's meaning is a question of
fact." Id. (citing St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989)). Further,
"[iln interpreting any provisions of a contract or restrictive covenant, the entire agreement must

be viewed as a whole." Id. "Once a restrictive covenant has been determined to be ambiguous,
the court must determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was drafted, gathered
from the language used and the circumstances which existed at its formulation." Thomas, 107
Idaho at 404.
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In this case, Brighton has made no argument on appeal, nor throughout the proceedings
below, that the intention ofthe parties was anything other than to maintain the residential nature
of the property, consistent with the theme of the nearby Spring Creek and Mill District
developments. Because the District Court made no assessment as to the intention of the parties
at the time that the Restrictive Covenants were drafted, it is not appropriate for this Court to do
so now. Balser, 110 Idaho at 40.
Nonetheless, the evidence before the District Court clearly established that the intention
of the parties was to limit development of the property solely to residential development.
(R. Exhibit 1, p. 3,

7

11, Ex. 10; Simmons Aff.) By Brighton's own admissions (through its

member and agent, David Turnbull), "[tlhere is a provision in purchase agreement [sic] between
Harris and Brighton that effects [sic] the proposed school site. . . . Essentially, the property was
anticipated to be residential development similar to . . . Spring Creek or Mill District." (Id.
(emphasis added).) When raised at the proper time, upon remand, the evidence will show that
the parties knowingly intended to restrict development of the property to residential use. Once
that fact is established, it will be a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Brighton's
actions, in selling the Property to an entity for a known purpose that was contrary to the
Restrictive Covenants, constituted a material breach of those Restrictive Covenants. First Sec.

Bankofldaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,792,964 P.2d 654,659 (1998).
Given the foregoing, this case should be remanded to the District Court to determine
whether the Restrictive Covenants include an express limitation on development of the property,
as Harris contends that they do, and to determine at trial whether Brighton's actions, in
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knowingly conveying the property to an entity that would not use the property for residential
purposes, constituted a breach of those Restrictive Covenants.
B.

Constitutional Protections Require That The Causes Of Action Arising From
Brighton's Breach Of The Terms Of The Restrictive Covenants Must Survive The
Condemnation Action.
As previously argued, the District Court erred when it absolved Brighton of any possible

breaches of the Restrictive Covenants by virtue of the School District's condemnation of the
Property. In executing the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Brighton and Hams voluntarily bound
themselves to and by certain contractual rights and obligations, as was their constitutionally
protected right. Well-settled constitutional law establishes a constitutionally-protected right of
private parties to maintain interests in contract rights freely and without any unreasonable
restraint by the state. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I,

5

16; See also Board of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a
contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable both
under the Contract Clause [Idaho Const. Art. I,

5

161 and the Due Process Clause of the United

States Constitution." Curr v. Cuvr, 124 Idaho 686,691-692,864 P.2d 132, 137-138 (1993). It is
clear, then, that no act of govermnent can ipso facto eliminate a cause of action between private
parties for breach of a valid and enforceable contract.

In the context of restrictive covenants, courts have held these contractual obligations to
be enforceable even when the government's power of eminent domain interferes with the
restrictive covenants. Crayder v. Seidman, 87 Pa. D. & C. 118 (Pa. Com. P1. 1953).
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A restrictive covenant cannot be held to restrict the power of
eminent domain but, where there is an act of an individual in an
attempt to evade the restriction, and because a public body is given
a gift, does that force the conclusion that ipso facto the right to
enforce the restriction evaporates?

One to whom land has been conveyed under an enforcible [sic]
restriction, will not be permitted to avoid the full force and effect
of the restriction by evasion.

Id. at 126, 128. To the extent that the power of eminent domain might be used as a tool for
parties to evade their contractual obligations, as the District Court has allowed Brighton to do, it
is a violation of section 16 of article I of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits any "law
impairing the obligation of contracts."
To be clear, the question here is not, as Brighton has attempted to convey, whether
Brighton violated the Restrictive Covenants after the property was acquired and condemned by
the School District. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-25.) Rather, as Harris has maintained at all
times, the question is whether Brighton breached the terms of the Restrictive Covenants when it
conveyed the land to an entity that it knew planned to improve the Property in a manner
inconsistent with the Restrictive Covenants? (See R. Vol. 1, pp. 83-85 (Counts One, Two and
Three of Harris's Third Party Complaint).) In other words, should Brighton be liable for
damages arising out of a breach founded on its intentional evasion of its contractual obligations?
(Tr. p. 119, Ll. 6-23.) Since the District Court did not analyze Hanis's breach of contract causes
of action as actually pled, this question was never addressed and is, therefore, ripe for remand.
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Moreover, to the extent that the District Court did extinguish Harris's causes of action
relative to the Restrictive Covenants by reliance on the condemnation proceeding, it did so in
error. The existence of the Restrictive Covenants in the Purchase and Sale Agreement were
terms as material to the contract as was the purchase price, itself. (See R. Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3, T/ 9,

Ex. 8; Simmons Aff.) Just as it would be constitutionally impermissible for the District Court to
have nullified any outstanding balance due and owing from Brighton to Harris from the purchase
price of the property, it is equally impermissible to summarily dismiss Brighton's other
obligations simply because an entity with the appropriate power later condemns the Restrictive
Covenants. (Tr. p. 171, L. 13 - p. 172, L. 14.) The District Court acknowledged this truth in the
example of the outstanding balance, but nevertheless denied Harris the opportunity to pursue its
rights under the other material terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. (Id.) Harris should
have the opportunity to seek damages associated with Brighton's intentional avoidance and/or
breach of the Restrictive Covenants. Accordingly, the District Court's decision must be reversed
as to the survival of Harris's causes of action sounding in breach of contract, as the District Court
impermissibly nullified Harris's contractual rights without due process.
C.

Harris Has A Valid Cause Of Action Against Brighton For Breach Of The Covenant
Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.

In its attempt to deflect liability for a probable breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, Brighton attempts to assert a rule of law that is both overbroad and
inconsistent with well-settled American jurisprudence. Significantly, Brighton's reliance on this
Court's 2009 decision in Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,203 P.3d 694 (2009),
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is misplaced. The rule of law that Respondent seemingly contends is established by Bushi (and
certain earlier decisions) is a much broader interpretation than what this Court has actually ruled.
Assuming for the moment that Brighton is correct in its argument that the express terms of the
contract do not contain the restrictions contended by Harris, or that Harris cannot prove a breach
of those Restrictive Covenants, Brighton appears to argue that the lack of such express terms or
express breach renders it impossible for Harris to sustain a cause of action for a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 29-30.) This is similar to the
tactic Brighton used below, attempting to "throw the baby out with the bathwater" by merely
equivocating Count Four of Harris's Third Party Complaint (Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing) with Counts One, Two and Three (Termination, Specific Performance
and Disgorgement of Profits, respectively). (See R. Exhibit 3, pp. 4-9; Brighton's Dismissal
Memo.;seealsoTr.p. 89,L.21-p.91,L. 19.)
Below, as now, Brighton asserted generally that Count Four ought to be dismissed, but
did not discuss or substantively address, from a factual or legal standpoint, the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Exhibit 3, pp. 4-9; Brighton's Dismissal Memo.) Brighton
went on to argue at oral argument that "Counts 1,2, 3, and essentially 4 as well" all ought to be
dismissed under the same theory advanced by Brighton: Since no express term of the contract
limited Brighton's sale of the property to an entity it knew would violate the restrictive
covenants, there cannot be a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

-
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fair dealing. (Tr. p. 89, L. 21

-

p. 91, L. 19.) Evidently, and over Harris's objections, the

District Court followed suit2 (R. Vol. U, pp. 250C - 250D.)
The scope of Bushi and the other cited case law on this issue is not, however, as Brighton
has contended. Rather, Bushi is and should be consistent with the Ninth Circuit case, Vylene
Enterprises, Inc. v. Nauglis, 90 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1996), which held that the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing applies to contracts even where there is no explicit or express contract term
that is overtly breached by the defendant. 90 F.3d at 1477. In Vylene, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the defendant franchisor had breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under a franchise agreement when it constructed "a competing restaurant within a
mile and a half of Vylene's restaurant," even though "Vylene did not have any rights to
exclusive territory under the [express] terms of the franchise agreement." Vylene, 90 F.3d at
1477 (citing Scheck v. Burger King Gorp., 756 F . Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991)). In Vylene, despite

Harris initially argued the difference between an action in breach of contract and an action in
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its Opposition to Brighton's
Motion to Dismiss. (R. Exhibit 4, p. 9; Harris Family Limited Partnership's Corrected
Memorandum in Opposition to Brighton Investments LLC's Motion to Dismiss ("Harris
Dismissal Opposition").) Notably, the District Court's Order on Brighton's Motion to Dismiss
neither mentions, analyzes, nor specifically dismisses Harris's cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Voi. U, p. 250D.) Rather, it dismisses "the
claims for breach of the purchase agreement, intentional interference with prospective economic
gain, and fraud . . . ." (Id.) The District Court's general conclusion, however, was an allinclusive grant of Brighton's motion to dismiss. (Id. at 250E.) Even after Harris, in its Motion
for Reconsideration of the District Court's Order of dismissal, again noted the distinction
between a breach of contract and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(R. Exhibit 6, p. 6; Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Connterclaimant/ThirdParty Plaintiff
Harris Family Limited Partnership's Motion for Reconsideration ("Harris Reconsideration
Memo.")), the District Court rejected the Motion wholesale without any additional analysis.
(R. Vol. 11, pp. 329A - 329C.)
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the lack of an express protection in the contract, it was held that the plaintiff "was still entitled to
expect that the [defendant] would 'not act to destroy the right of the [plaintiff] to enjoy the fruits
of the contract."' Id. (quoting Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 549.)
Applying the Ninth Circuit's reasoning to the case at bar, it is entirely possible for
Brighton to have breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the Purchase
and Sale Agreement even ifthe finder of fact does not detennine that any of the express terms of
the contract were specifically breached. CJ: Vylene, 90 F.3d at 1477. This proposition is
supported by this Court's decision in Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 799 P.2d 70
(1990), wherein it was decided that a cause of action based on the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing could be sustained even though the plaintiff therein could not maintain a cause
of action based on breach of contract. 118 Idaho at 669-670. While the District Court here
found that Brighton's "knowledge of a likely breach in the future is not a breach that gives rise to
a cause of action" for breach of the express terms of the contract (R. Vol. 11, p. 250C), it does not
follow that Harris's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be
eliminated therewith. CJ: Vylene, 90 F.3d at 1477.
As noted, this Court's decision in Bushi, and thus the relevant Idaho law on this cause of
action, does not run contrary to the rule established by the Ninth Circuit in Vylene: "No covenant
will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the
parties." Bushi, 146 Idaho at 768 (emphasis added) (quoting Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss

Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991)). Thus, if the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is not contrary to the express terms of the contract, Bushi will have no negating

-
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effect on the claim. The evidence of record, as presented below, establishes that a reasonable
juror could determine that Brighton acted in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when it sold the property to a buyer that it knew would engage in activity that ran
afoul of the Restrictive Covenants. Dismissal of this claim was, therefore, inappropriate.
Notably, Bushi also includes an implicit declaration that is of even greater help to
Harris's position in this appeal. As stated by this Court, "a violation of the covenant occurs only
when 'either party

. . . violates, nullifies or simificantly impairs anv benefit of the . . . contract

. . .."' Id. (emphasis added); see also Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 669. In the present case, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that Harris contends is a part of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement is not contrary to the express terms, but is merely a covenant that exists in addition lo
and independent of those terms.

Under Brighton's characterization of Bushi, an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing would never exist in a contract unless it was expressly
stated

-

an interpretation that is logically inconsistent with the very nature of an implied

covenant. Contrastingly, this Court indicated that had the appellant in Bushi been able to "show
that Respondents violated, nullified, or signzjkantly impaired the operating agreement," he also
would have been able to sustain an argument that the respondents "acted in breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. (emphasis added). Ergo, if Harris is able to show
that Brighton's actions "significantly impaired" the benefits that were intended to inure to Harris
under the Restrictive Covenants, Harris can maintain an action for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing insofar as is necessary to withstand summary judgment andor
dismissal. Bushi, 203 P.3d at 768-769. This issue should be remanded to the District Court.
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D.

Harris's Claim For Unjust Enrichment Against Brighton Must Survive If The
District Court's Dismissal Of The Breach Of Contract Actions Is Upheld.
Harris initially notes that the record below reveals that the District Court was convinced,

even before Brighton's Motion for Summary Judgment on Harris's claim for unjust enrichment
was filed, that Harris's sole remedy for any damages it sustained from these transactions was
limited to severance damages from the condemnation action. (Tr. p. 172, L. 23 - p. 173, L. 5.)
\

In saying this, the District Court acknowledged that those severance damages were intended to
compensate for "the value of Harris' other property [which] was diminished by the
condemnation of the covenant." (Id. (emphasis added).) What the District Court failed to
recognize at that stage, and what Respondent fails to recognize now, however, is that Harris's
claim for unjust enrichment was not aimed at receiving compensation for damage to its other
property, as caused by the loss of the enjoyment of the Restrictive Covenants. Instead, the claim
for unjust enrichment seeks compensation for Brighton's unfair gain in purchasing the 21.54
acres of property subject to restrictive covenants, yet selling the same property as if those same
restrictions did not exist3 (Tr. p. 235, L. 22 - p. 236, L. 22.) Accordingly, Brighton's argument

The difference here is easily illustrated by a diagram consisting of two concentric circles: All
area within the inside circle represents the damages claimed by Harris on account of the unjust
enrichment enjoyed by Brighton and associated with the 21.54 acres conveyed by Brighton and
condemned by the school. The value assigned to those damages, according to Appellant's
expert, is $2,250,000.00. (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2, 7 2, Ex. A; Affidavit of Paul R. Hyde, EA,
MCBA, ASA, MAT, in Opposition to Brighton Investments, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Hyde Aff.").) All area within the outside circle (excluding the inside circle)
represents the incidental damages claimed by Harris (and now determined) on account of
severance damages associated with damage to Harris's remaining, surrounding property. The
value assigned to those damages, per the settlement between Harris and the School District, is
$175,000.00.
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that Harris has already received an adequate remedy at law, based on the condemnation action,
wholly misses the distinction between the separate wrongs asserted by Harris for damage to
separate interests and for which separate standards and awards of damages apply. (Tr. p. 240,

L. 25 - p. 242, L. 1.)
In its brief, Brighton essentially tracks the same position taken by the District Court in its
Order granting summary judgment in hvor of Brighton. (Compare Respondent's Brief, p. 35

with R. Vol. 11, p. 400.) Particularly, Brighton argues that Harris has failed to satisfy the prima
facie elements of a claim for unjust enrichment, as established by Vanderford Co. v. Knudson,
144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (2007). (Id.) However, as argued by Harris below, each of the
three elements has been sufficiently established so as to preclude entry of summary judgment
and,therefore, now warrant reversal of the District Court on this issue. (Tr. p. 235, L. 22 p. 237, L. 22.) Vanderford requires that a plaintiff in an unjust enrichment claim establish
"(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value
thereof." Vanderford, 144 Idaho at 558. In order, the evidence presented to the District Court by
Harris established all of the required elements:
(1)

The benefit conferred upon Brighton by Harris was the sale of the Property at a
market price that was burdened by the restrictive covenants and, thus, lower than
if the Restrictive Covenants did not exist (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2, fi 2, Ex. A, p. 17-19;
Hyde Aff.; see also R. Exhibit 13, p. 6,fi 16; Harris Family Limited Partnership's
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Separate Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Brighton Investments,
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Harris Statement of Facts"));
(2)

Brighton appreciated the above-noted benefit as conferred by Harris by virtue of
its purchase of the Property at a market price that was burdened by the restrictive
covenants. (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2 , 7 2, Ex. A, p. 17-19; Hyde Aff.) Brighton further
appreciated the benefit when it was able to convey the property to the State Board
of Education on behalf of Boise State University at a combined sale and gift value
as if the Property was not burdened by the Restrictive Covenants and, thus, at a
market price much higher than if the Property was burdened (Id.); and

(3)

Under these circumstances, where Brighton was able to purchase the Property at a
value burdened by the Restrictive Covenants and then sell the Property at a value
as if such burdens did not exist, based on its knowledge that the buyer's plan was
to ultimately nullify the Restrictive Covenants, it would be inequitable for
Brighton to enjoy the full benefit of the increased sale price without any
compensation to Harris. (Tr. p. 242, L. 6 - p. 243, L. 4.)

Because Hams established all of the facts required to support a claim for unjust
enrichment, the case should be remanded for a trial on this claim.
111. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

Given the arguments and authorities contained in Harris's briefing on appeal, the District
Court erred in granting Brighton's Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. This case
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ought to be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with remand
instructions from this Court. Thus, on appeal, Brighton is not the prevailing party in this appeal
and is, therefore, not entitled to costs or attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rules 40 or 41, nor
under any other relevant statutory or contractual provision. As this case is appropriate for
remand, thus reviving some or all of Harris's causes of action against Brighton, Harris is the
prevailing party and is entitled to the fees and costs allowable under Idaho Appellate Rules 40
and 41, Idaho Code 5 12-120, and the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, together with the arguments and authorities contained within
Appellant's opening brief, Harris maintains that its Third Party Complaint states valid causes of
action against Brighton sounding in breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore, genuine issues of material fact exist, which ought to
have precluded the entry of summary judgment, with respect to Harris's claim against Brighton
for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, Harris respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
decisions of the District Court on Brighton's Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Summary
Judgment, to remand this case back to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with
such a reversal, for an award to Harris of the reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with
this appeal, and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Ill
Ill

-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1lthday of March, 2010.
GREENER BURKEi SHOEMAKER, P.A.
Richard H. Greener
Fredric V. Shoemaker
Thomas J. Lloyd I11
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 3 19-2600
Facsimile:
(208) 319-2601
Email:
rqeener@greenerlaw.com
fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@gveenerlaw.com
By:
Richard H. Greener
Attorneys for Third Party PlaintifflAppellant
Harris Family Limited Partnership
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